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ABSTRACT
Treatment is highly cost-effective in reducing an individual’s substance abuse (SA) and associated
harms.  However, data from Treatment Episodes (TEDS) indicate that per capita treatment admissions
substantially lagged behind increases in heavy drug use from 1992-2007.  Only ten percent of individuals
with clinical SA disorders receive any treatment, and almost half who forgo treatment point to accessibility
and cost constraints as barriers to care.  This study investigates the impact of state mental health and
SA parity legislation on treatment admission flows and cost-sharing.  Fixed effects specifications indicate
that mandating comprehensive parity for mental health and SA disorders raises the probability that
a treatment admission is privately insured, lowering costs for the individual.  Despite some crowd-out
of charity care for private insurance, mandates reduce the uninsured probability by a net 2.4 percentage
points.  States mandating comprehensive parity also see an increase in total treatment admissions.
Thus, increasing cost-sharing and reducing financial barriers may aid the at-risk population in obtaining
adequate SA treatment.  Supply constraints mute effect sizes, suggesting that demand-focused interventions
need to be complemented with policies supporting treatment providers. These results have implications
for the effectiveness of the 2008 Federal Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act in increasing














1.  INTRODUCTION 
  Of the twenty million individuals with clinical alcohol or drug abuse disorders 
(collectively known as substance abuse or SA disorders), only ten percent received treatment in 
the past year, implying that nearly eighteen million went untreated (2007 National Survey of 
Drug Use and Health - NSDUH).  Among those who do not obtain treatment, nearly 50 % point 
to cost constraints or lack of insurance coverage as impediments to care.  Even amongst the 
privately-insured, almost one out of four cite affordability or non-coverage issues.  
  Mental illness or SA disorders are not treated at par with physical illness by public and 
private insurers.  The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, effective from January 1, 1998, 
addressed  this coverage disparity  by mandating that group health insurance coverage offered by 
large employers (with over 50 employees) must cover mental illness equal to the lifetime and 
annual caps for physical illnesses.  This Act, however, did not apply to SA disorders and 
chemical dependency nor did it fully address unequal coverage since insurers could still set 
higher co-payments and deductibles with lower treatment limits for mental illnesses.  Some of 
the loopholes have been addressed by the recently enacted Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act of 2008, effective October 3, 2009.  Applying to both mental health as well as SA 
disorders, it mandates parity for all financial requirements (including deductibles, co-payments, 
coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses), treatment limitations (including limits on the 
frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, or other limits on treatment scope or 
duration), and out-of-network benefits of group health plans.  More importantly, with continued 
availability of cost and non-group health plan exemptions, the new law, similar to the 1996 
provisions, continues to apply only to policies with existing mental health benefits.  Group plans 
that do not already offer mental health coverage are not required to do so.      4
  To rectify these loopholes several states have legislated more generous provisions.  
Whether improved access to treatment and reduction of out-of-pocket costs have had a positive 
impact on the decision to seek treatment depends on how effective the laws have been in 
facilitating significant cost-sharing and expanding access for individuals in need.  This study 
exploits the substantial state-level differences in both scope and timing of enactment of the parity 
laws to analyze the impact of such mandates on flows into SA treatment admissions.  We also 
investigate the impact of these laws on cost-sharing by examining how they have affected the 
probability that a treatment admission is covered by private insurance or is uninsured.  With low 
prevalence of SA treatment and reporting biases, population and household surveys do not 
provide adequate sample sizes to facilitate rigorous analyses of state or locality-specific policy 
factors.  Spanning 1992 though 2007, this study employs administrative data on almost 26 
million treatment admissions from the Treatment Episodes Data Set (TEDS), matched with each 
state’s insurance policy.   Fixed-effects specifications account and control for statistical and 
policy endogeneity as well as unobservables potentially correlated with policies and treatment 
admissions. 
  If the comprehensive state mandates are found to be effective, then with only 12 states 
currently offering full parity, there is considerable scope for policy interventions.  The results 
also have implications for the likely effects of the 2008 Parity Act on substance abuse treatment 
admissions and insurance coverage. 
2.  BACKGROUND 
  An extensive body of literature indicates the effectiveness of drug abuse treatment in 
reducing drug use and associated harms including adverse health effects, crime, HIV infection, 
and unemployment, relative to no treatment.
1 For instance, in a large sample of opiate-dependent 
                                                            
1 See, for instance, Reuter and Pollack (2006), Stewart et al. (2002), Institute of Medicine (2000), and Metzger 
(1998).   5
individuals in Philadelphia, 21 % of treated individuals tested positive for HIV after seven years 
versus 51 % in a matched no-treatment group (McLellan et al., 2000).  Furthermore, cost-benefit 
studies have consistently shown that treatment imparts positive economic returns with benefits 
far exceeding costs.  Rajkumar and French (1997) conclude, for instance, that conservative 
benefits of avoided criminal activity and intangible victimization costs alone outweigh even the 
most expensive residential treatment programs.  According to California’s Drug and Alcohol 
Treatment Assessment, a dollar invested in substance abuse treatment yields a return of seven 
dollars from reduced health care costs, crime, lost-productivity, and other prevented adverse 
consequences (Delaney et al., 2000).   
  Studies also show that drug abuse treatment may be cost-effective relative to other 
alternatives.  The cost of treatment (about $12,500 for residential and $3,100 for outpatient 
treatment per person-year) is significantly less than the cost of incarceration (about $40,000 per 
person-year) (Schneider Institute of Health Policy, 2001).  Examination of state-level 
expenditures on criminal justice and public health programs (Saffer et al. (2001), yield a cost 
saving differential of 30% in the use of treatment relative to the use of enforcement and the 
criminal justice system.
2  Rydell et al. (1996) show the cost effectiveness of treatment of heavy 
substance users over source country control, interdiction, or domestic enforcement.   
  Despite this apparent consensus on the cost-effectiveness of drug abuse treatment, a 
gradual reallocation of federal funding from demand to supply reduction has been taking place.   
(Figure 1).   The share of the federal drug control budget for law enforcement, interdiction, and 
border control has steadily risen from 47 to 65 % from 1995 through 2009, contrasted to the 
                                                            
2 Such comparative studies need cautious interpretation as the various approaches are not necessarily 
alternatives.   Treatment and criminal justice may be mutually reinforcing.  For instance, enforcement 
activities affect treatment decisions and treatment referrals sometimes originate in the criminal justice 
system through drug courts or alternative sentencing.    6
decline in funding for treatment programs and treatment research over this period (35 % to 23 
%).  Prevention activities declined in share from 18 to 12 %.
3 
  Concurrently, treatment admissions have failed to keep up with recent increases in 
substance abuse. Figure 2 documents the trends for population-adjusted (ages 15+) drug-related 
hospital emergency department (ED) visits derived from the Drug Abuse Warning Network 
(DAWN) and SA treatment admissions.  Contrast the over 35% increase during 1992 through 
2002 of total substance-related ED visits with the relatively flat trend in treatment admissions.
4  
Two thirds of all SA treatment admissions cite cocaine, heroin and marijuana as primary, 
secondary, or tertiary substances of abuse.   Figures 3 and 4 break down the separate trends. 
While ED visits related to cocaine and heroin use increased over this same period by about 53 %, 
related treatment admissions increased by less than six percent, with a recent downward trend.   
  Treatment, however, represents a significant cost barrier for substance users.  Mental 
health and substance abuse parity legislation is aimed at overcoming discrimination against those 
with mental illnesses as well as reducing out-of-pocket expenses towards treatment benefits.   
Due to the high comorbidity between mental disorders and substance abuse, mental health parity 
laws may have a positive externality on SA treatment.  Saffer and Dave (2005) show that 
individuals diagnosed with a mental illness in their lifetime are three times more likely to be 
cocaine users relative to individuals with no mental illnesses.  Two-stage models indicate a 
                                                            
3 There is a break in the data series in 2001, due to a restructuring of how the federal drug control budget is reported.  
However, this does not affect broad-based comparisons of the relative shares.  Source: Office of National Drug 
Control Policy, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Summary. 
4 Trends in drug-related ED visits are presented only until 2002 since a re-design of the DAWN sampling frame 
makes data from 2003 onwards non-comparable to any of the prior years.  Nevertheless, recent DAWN data also 
suggest an increase in population-adjusted drug-related ED visits (by 5 % between 2004-2006).  Part of the growth 
in drug-related hospital ED visits may be due to an increase in the purity of illicit substances.  The steady trend in 
drug-related ED visits however does not perfectly mimic the trends in drug purity.  For instance, the average purity 
of powder cocaine reached a high in the early to mid-1980s, declined somewhat in the early 1990s, remained stable 
for the rest of the decade, and has recently shown signs of rising again.  Heroin purity increased dramatically from 
the early 1980s until about 1993, and has remained relative stable since.  In contrast, cocaine and heroin-related ED 
visits have mostly exhibited a steady upward trend over the past 25 years.  Some of the increase in ED admissions 
may also be driven by inexperienced drug users, though generally all age groups share in the rising trend in drug-
related ED visits.     7
causal link from higher prevalence of mental illness to increased substance abuse.  Any policy 
that effectively reduces the cost of psychiatric treatment may therefore have a positive impact on 
SA treatment.
5   
  Evidence on the effectiveness of mental health parity legislation, however, is mixed.  
Studies have only considered the impact of such legislation on mental health services utilization 
and not on outcomes related to SA treatment.  Whereas McGuire and Montgomery (1982) and 
Frank (1985) find an increased utilization of psychiatric services, recent studies offer mixed 
evidence.  A SAMHSA report studied the experience of two insurers (Blue Cross/Blue Shield - 
BCBS and Kaiser/Community Health Plan) covering 80 % of Vermont’s privately insured 
population, subsequent to the state’s parity law taking effect on January 1, 1998 (Hausman, 
2003).  Parity significantly increased the likelihood of insured individuals receiving mental 
health treatment, on the order of 18 to 24 %; there was also a rise in outpatient visits per use.
6  
Using state level data, Klick and Markowitz (2006) conclude that mental health mandates are 
ineffective in reducing suicide rates.  Based on individual-level data from the Healthcare for 
Communities survey, Pacula and Sturm (2000) find that such legislation has not significantly 
increased utilization of mental health services, though they surmise that this may be due to 
insurance displacement for high-risk individuals.   
  Underscoring the limited scope of the 1996 federal law and its various exemptions, 
several studies show the state mandates have had limited or no effect on employees.  For 
instance, Gruber (1994) shows that state mandates for certain health services including substance 
                                                            
5 This characterization of the substance user as being responsive to incentives and variations in costs and benefits is 
borne out in the literature.  Studies have shown that drug consumption does respond negatively to monetary prices 
and the probability of arrest (Grossman et al. 2002, Dave 2006).  Saffer and Dave (2005) analyzed the demand for 
addictive substances among individuals with mental disorders, a sub-population that may be most likely to abstain 
from rational decision-making.  However, their study further confirms that even mentally-ill individuals cut back on 
their alcohol use, cigarette smoking, and cocaine use when monetary prices rise.  Also see Becker, Grossman, and 
Murphy (1991) for an analysis of the drug user as a rational, lifetime utility maximizing agent. 
6 However, costs of providing mental health and substance abuse treatment increased only from 2.3 % of spending 
for all services to 2.47 % for BCBS.  Other studies have also shown that a popular argument against enacting such 
laws, namely an increase in health care costs, remains unfounded (Sturm et al., 1999).     8
abuse and mental illness, by often being lower than existing benefits, have no impact on the 
probability of coverage for an employee of a small firm.  In fact, state mandates to cover alcohol 
treatment may lower the probability that a small firm offers insurance.  Consistent with this 
explanation, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA 1999) 
reported that almost half of all eligible employers were already compliant with the federal 
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 prior to becoming effective, and 68 % of the plans witnessed 
no change in benefits.   
  That evidence on the effects of insurance mandates on mental health services utilization 
is mixed is not to say that substance abuse and mental health treatment do not respond to prices 
or cost-sharing.  Goodman et al. (1999) analyze an insurance claims database from self-insured 
employers and find that, conditional on treatment, substance abuse and mental health treatment 
respond to the price of care.  Their results show that the magnitude of the price elasticity is 
directly related to the co-insurance rate.   
  Thus the answer to the still open question on the effect of mental health parity laws on 
SA treatment admissions may hinge on whether the laws effectively expand access for 
individuals in need and facilitate significant cost-sharing.  We are not aware of any large-scale, 
nationally-representative studies which have directly examined the link between mental health / 
substance abuse parity legislation and flows into treatment admissions and payment source of the 
admissions.   
3.  DATA 
3.1 Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS) 
  The empirical work is based on substance abuse treatment admission flows derived from 
the Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS).  TEDS is an administrative data system designed to 
collect information on the number and characteristics of treatment admissions into private and   9
public facilities receiving any public funding (including state agency funding and federal block 
grants).  Data are collected by substance abuse agencies during the treatment intake interview 
with the client, and then forwarded to SAMHSA for processing.  TEDS covers about 85 % of 
total admissions to eligible providers, which represents about 67 % of the entire population of 
treatment admissions to all known providers.
7  Due to the difficulties in obtaining data, states 
generally do not report information from purely private facilities that do not receive any state or 
public funds.
8  Thus, while TEDS is not expected to represent a random subset of the entire 
population of treatment admissions, the population captured by TEDS is more likely to be low-
income and low-education and is also more likely to be confronted with accessibility and cost-
sharing issues relative to treatment admissions in purely private facilities.  
  We employ data from 1992 to 2007 and restrict the analysis to clients who are 18 years of 
age and older, resulting in 25,742,103 SA treatment admission records.  For each admission, 
primary, secondary, and tertiary substances of abuse are observed along with client 
demographics, source of referral, prior history, insurance status, and payment source.
9  In 2007, 
alcohol was the most prevalent primary substance of abuse among admissions (42.2 %), 
followed by heroin (14.6 %), cocaine (13.9 %) and marijuana (12 %).   
  Table 1 presents the demographic composition of treatment admissions and drug use 
between 1992 and 2007. Data for drug consumption are based on self-reported past year illicit 
drug use and recoded illicit drug or alcohol abuse or dependence from the National Household 
                                                            
7 About 58 % of all treatment facilities are privately-operated but non-profit, about 29 % are private for-profit, and 
the remainder are operated by the state, local or federal government (National Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment 
Services, 2007).  About 81 % of SA treatment admissions occur in TEDS-eligible facilities, with the remainder 
occurring in purely private facilities. 
8 The scope of facilities included in TEDS is affected by state-level differences in licensure, certification, and 
accreditation practices, and disbursement of public funds.  For example, some state SA agencies regulate private 
facilities and individual practitioners, while others do not. To account for any such state-level variations, all models 
control for state fixed effects and a vector of state-level factors related to mental health, drug use, health care 
spending, and public funding of SA treatment.   
9 Information on client insurance status and actual payment source, asked in 40 states over the sample period, is 
available from the TEDS supplemental module.  There are no systematic differences in admission characteristics 
between these 40 states and the full sample.   10
Survey of Drug Abuse (NHSDA).
10    Admissions are predominantly male and White with a 
slight decline in the former between 1992 and 2007 suggestive of an increase in illicit drug use 
among females.  Despite a decrease in past year illicit drug use, treatment admissions amongst 
Whites increased from 61.8 to 65.3 %.  Blacks’ share of treatment admissions declined from 27.2 
to 21.4 % coinciding with a small decrease in their past year usage.  There is also a rise in 
treatment admissions of young adults, older adults and those with high school degrees and above, 
even as they have increased illicit drug use over this period.     
  Among past year drug users, the vast majority (64-67 %) were privately insured.  
Compare this to SA treatment admissions, in which only about 5.3 % of clients had private 
health insurance in 2007, with this share having declined from 9.5 % in 1992.  In contrast, the 
share of admissions with public insurance (Medicaid or Medicare) increased from 19 to 27 % 
possibly reflecting in part the expansions in general Medicaid eligibility  that occurred in the 
early to mid-1990s.   
  Being privately insured does not necessarily mean that the client’s treatment services are 
covered by insurance.  In 2007, about 22 % of privately-insured individuals reported in the 
NHSDA that they did not receive treatment due to affordability issues or because it was not 
covered.  Among privately insured clients in TEDS, 44 % paid mostly out-of-pocket 
(presumably because their plans do not offer commensurate coverage of SA treatment services); 
this share has almost doubled since 1992 (22.3 %).  Private insurance covered treatment services 
only 34 % of the time (down from 66 % in 1992).  Thus, there are two noteworthy trends: first is 
the decline in private insurance status among treatment admissions, and second is the decline in 
coverage of treatment services conditional on insurance.
11   
                                                            
10 A redesigned sampling frame for the NHSDA in 2002 and 2003 makes earlier years non-comparable to periods 
post-2002.  Thus, prevalence rates are presented for 1992 and 2001. 
11 There has also been a slight decline in self-referrals and an increase in referrals from criminal justice sources.  The 
decline in self-referrals may be indicative of payment and cost constraints. Even though self-referrals declined, a   11
There has also been a suggestive increase in supply constraints over the past 16 years.  
Both the number of facilities offering SA treatment as well the number of admissions per capita 
have remained relatively flat. The mean waiting period between request for service and actual 
admission (or first provision of clinical service) increased from about 5.5 to 7 days.  While the 
majority of clients enter treatment with no waiting time, this share has also declined from its 
peak of 73 % to 64 % over the past decade.  These disparities suggest unequal propensity in 
seeking and obtaining treatment, partly related to cost and supply constraints.   
3.2  Data Linked to TEDS 
  We matched the TEDS admission records to several additional variables based on year 
and state where the admission took place.  The supplementary data include information on 
mental health parity laws, illicit drug-related arrests, suicide mortality, health care and Medicaid 
spending, welfare reform legislation, and other state-level socio-economic conditions.   
Legislation regarding mental health parity laws is derived from the National Conference 
of State Legislatures database on State Laws Mandating or Regulating Mental Health.
12  Three 
dichotomous indicators capture a state’s legislation status regarding mandating broad, limited, or 
weak insurance parity for the treatment of mental health disorders.  The first indicator of broad 
parity relates to states which mandate comprehensive parity for the treatment of mental illnesses 
with few or no exceptions.  These states require insurers to provide, as for physical illness, the 
same level of benefits for a broad range of mental health conditions, including substance abuse 
disorders and chemical dependency.  These benefits include inpatient and outpatient visit limits, 
co-payments, deductibles, and annual and lifetime limits.  The laws apply to group health plans 
in all cases, and to most individual health plans.   As of 2007, only twelve states had legislated 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
greater portion of self-referrals was insured in 2007 versus 1992 suggesting a significant selection relating to cost-
constraints and health coverage in terms of who seeks treatment. 
12 See http://www.ncsl.org/ and Rickert and Ro (2003)   12
such broad parity compared to no states in 1992.
13  The second measure reflects states 
mandating limited mental health benefits where parity only applies to certain groups (ex: those 
with severe biologically-based mental illness or state and local employees).  In addition, some of 
these states only require employers to offer parity in one of their health plans (mandated 
offering) or require parity only if the plan already offers any type of mental health service 
(mandated if offered).  Other states mandate a minimum benefit that is less than equal to that for 
physical illnesses.  In addition, parity laws in many of these states do not apply to substance 
abuse disorders.  In 2007, 36 states plus D.C. mandated such parity with exceptions, compared to 
17 states in 1992.  None of these states requires group health insurers to provide both mental 
health as well as SA benefits with full parity.  The third group, which comprises the reference 
group in all specifications, includes states for which parity legislation is either non-existent or 
fraught with exceptions; for those states that do have some legislation, parity does not extend to 
substance abuse disorders or chemical dependency and also does not apply to group health plans 
(which comprise the vast majority of the insured in the U.S.).  In 1992, there were 33 states and 
D.C. with non-existent or weak mental health parity (hereby denoted as weak parity).  By 2007, 
only 2 states remained (ID and WY).  Figure 5 shows the progression of states from weak to 
limited to broad parity over the sample period.  We exploit this substantial variation in the scope 
and timing of enactment of the state laws to identify their impact on treatment admission flows 
and cost-sharing. 
  To separate out the effect of insurance parity legislation from other shifts in state funding, 
models control for block grants for state substance abuse treatment and prevention.
14  Another 
concurrent policy shift that occurred during the 1990s related to welfare reform.  To account for 
                                                            
13 The states with broad mental health parity in 2007 are: AR, CT, IN, ME, MD, MN, NC, OR, RI, VT, VA, and 
WV. 
14 These are funds appropriated by Congress for use by states, and account for about 40% of public funds spent on 
prevention and treatment in the states.   13
welfare reform, we construct an indicator, based on the characterization in the 1997 report by 
the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA, 1997; U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 1999), for the fraction of time period t that a given state had a waiver in place that 
substantially altered the nature of its Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program.
15 We also define a similar indicator for whether a given state had implemented changes 
to its welfare policies under Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF).  Finally, in addition to 
capturing the timing of welfare reform, we also include welfare caseloads in each state as a 
proxy for the reform.  Since the parity indicators are measured at the state level, additional 
locality-specific socioeconomic and policy variables are included in models to capture time-
varying trends within states.  Table 2 describes these measures and presents means for all 
analysis variables for the sample period (1992-2007).  
4.  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
  Since addictive substances are ultimately consumer goods, the analysis can be framed 
within the context of consumer theory.  The probability that a given substance user would seek 
treatment is a function of the discounted net benefits of treatment.  It would be cost-effective for 
an individual to undergo SA treatment if lifetime benefits exceeded the lifetime costs. Cost-
sharing through insurance would lower the cost of seeking treatment and make treatment a more 
attractive option for substance users, ceteris paribus.  Thus, health insurance parity laws, by 
mandating full mental health and SA parity, may expand the coverage of substance abuse 
treatment and lower out-of-pocket costs to the individual.   
  In studying the effects of state parity legislation on SA treatment admissions, we proceed 
in two steps.  First, we investigate whether the enactment of insurance parity increased the 
number of treatment admissions in the state.  While we estimate models for the total number of 
                                                            
15 For instance, NJ implemented a major AFDC waiver on October 1, 1992.  Thus, the indicator for AFDC waiver 
for NJ takes on a value of 0.25 for 1992, reflecting the three months in that year that the waiver was in effect.   14
SA treatment admissions as a baseline comparison, we mainly focus on treatment admissions 
that are self or privately-referred (the latter also including referral through a health-care provider 
or an employer) for two reasons.
16  First, this focus is more consistent with consumer choice 
framework which explicitly assumes that it is the consumer who makes the decision to seek 
treatment based on cost-benefit calculus.  Second, changes in insurance policy are a demand-
driven intervention and in general applicable to individuals on the margin of seeking treatment; 
by affecting out-of-pocket payments for treatment services, parity legislation would presumably 
impact an individual’s propensity to seek treatment.  As a result of this rational choice, self-
referrals are likely to be most sensitive to insurance changes and will therefore capture an upper-
bound effect of insurance legislation on SA treatment admissions.          
(1)   Tst = Est exp (λ0 + λ 1Lst + Zst Ω + υs + τt + ωst) 
Equation (1) posits that the total number of SA treatment admissions for state s in year t is a 
function of parity laws (L), a vector of state-varying characteristics such as economic conditions 
and SA-related funding (Z), and a stochastic disturbance (ω). All specifications control for state 
(υ) and year (τ) fixed effects, which account for unobserved time-invariant state heterogeneity 
and overall trends.  We estimate this specification using a Poisson regression model for two 
reasons.  First, the discrete nature of the outcome variable as a count of admissions makes the 
Poisson probability distribution especially suitable.  Second, the Poisson framework does not 
suffer from the “incidental parameters” problem and can accommodate fixed effects well 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).  Since the Poisson framework implicitly assumes that the mean of 
each count (for state s and year t) is equal to its variance, we adjust all standard errors for over-
                                                            
16 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.   15
dispersion as described in Wooldridge (2001).   Exposure for each unit is represented by Est, 
which can be proxied by state population.
17      
  Estimates from equation (1) will inform on whether comprehensive SA treatment parity 
increases flows into treatment facilities.  Since such state legislation is hypothesized to work 
through cost-sharing and coverage of SA and mental health treatment, we further investigate 
whether the parity mandates affected the probability that a treatment admission is insured versus 
uninsured.   
(2) Prob(Cist = 1) = Φ(β0 + β1Lst + Xist Γ + Zst Π + υs + τt + εist) 
In the above specification, C represents a coverage indicator for whether the i
th SA treatment 
admission, in state s and year t, is privately-insured (and in alternative models, uninsured or 
publicly insured).  Equation (2) postulates that this insurance status is a function of state 
regulations regarding mental health parity (L), a vector of admission-specific characteristics such 
as the client’s demographic measures, type of admission, and service setting (X), a vector of 
state-specific factors including the total number of treatment admissions, economic conditions, 
and SA treatment funding (Z), and a stochastic admission-specific disturbance (ε).  Unmeasured 
time-invariant, state-specific characteristics (υ) and overall trends (τ) are accounted for by state 
and year fixed effects, respectively.  The key parameter of interest is β1, the marginal effect of 
the state mandate on the insurance status of treatment admissions.  Specification 2 is estimated 
via probit regression with Φ denoting the standard normal distribution.
18 
  Specifications (1) and (2) are akin to a difference-in-differences (DD) framework.  The 
effect of policy is estimated by comparing changes in outcomes pre- and post-legislation for 
                                                            
17 Specifying state population as the exposure constrains the coefficient of the natural log of population to one in the 
Poisson framework.  We estimate models by including log population as a covariate with its coefficient free-varying 
since state population may also proxy for the other state differences.  Results are robust to both specifications.   
18 Results are not sensitive to estimation via logit regression or linear probability models with heteroscedasticity 
correction.   16
states that enacted parity laws over 1992-2007 relative to states that did not enact or change 
their laws.  This effect is identified only through within-state variation in parity laws over time. 
5.  RESULTS 
5.1  State Parity Legislation and Aggregate SA Treatment Admissions 
  Table 3 presents estimates of the Poisson model specified in equation (1).  The first 
specification indicates that broad parity for mental health and SA treatment benefits significantly 
affects total flows into SA treatment admissions.  Specifically, states which enact broad parity 
see a 12.8 % increase in total treatment admissions, relative to the reference group of states with 
weak parity.  Contrast this to a marginal 4.7% increase for states with limited (far less 
comprehensive in scope and accompanied by various exclusions) parity legislation. 
  Since self-referred individuals with SA are likely to be more motivated to seek treatment 
if the services are covered under their health plans, relating parity legislation to the number of 
total self-referred admissions in the state is likely to trace the possible role of cost sharing 
through which parity legislation can impact treatment admissions.  As hypothesized, 
specification 2 shows that the marginal effect of broad parity legislation increases substantially 
in magnitude, suggesting that such laws increase the number of self-referrals by 23.1 %.  Limited 
parity has no impact.  Specification 3, which broadens individual-initiated treatment to include 
admissions referred by a health-care provider or an employer, likewise indicates that broad parity 
is associated with a 20.7 % increase in such admissions while limited parity shows no effect. 
  Specification 4 considers SA treatment admissions referred through the criminal justice 
system.  Since these admissions are more likely to reflect coercion or mandatory diversion of 
non-violent drug offenders into treatment, we would not expect insurance parity laws to have any 
significant impact.  The results reassuringly confirm this hypothesis. While these estimates are 
insignificant, the non-zero magnitudes may pick up any residual effect of unobserved state-  17
varying factors.  Thus, criminal-justice admissions may be utilized as a further control group 
to purge the effect of unobservables from the estimated effects for self-referred or privately-
referred admissions.  Table 3, which presents these as the difference-in-difference-in-differences 
(DDD) estimates, suggest that broad mental health parity has increased self-referred and 
privately-referred admissions between 11-14 %.
19  The DDD estimates confirm that limited 
parity laws have no significant effect on any measure of SA treatment admissions.
20 
  It should be noted that the reported effect magnitudes of the parity legislation are not 
sizeable since they represent the impact of a 100 % increase in the probability of enacting broad 
parity, which is about 3.3 times the observed standard deviation in these laws.  Thus, a one 
standard deviation increase in the probability of enacting broad parity would raise self-referred 
admissions by about 4.2 %.
21     
5.2  Specification Checks 
  The DDD estimates provide one way to purge the effects of unobservable time-variant 
state factors.  Additional specification checks, that directly control for confounding policy shifts 
and state-specific socioeconomic measures and which account for policy endogeneity, are 
presented in Table 3.  Panel A presents models for self-referred admissions.    
                                                            
19 The DDD estimate is constructed by subtracting the coefficient estimates on criminal justice referrals from 
corresponding estimates on self and private referrals. 
20 With respect to the demographic covariates, self-referred (criminal justice-referred) SA treatment admissions are 
quadratic in age, increasing up to age 39 (33) and declining subsequently.  States with more self-referred treatment 
admissions also tend to have higher admissions being female and educated, in contrast to criminal justice-referred 
admissions which are more likely to be male and low-educated.  Both increase with the prevalence of Blacks in total 
state treatment admissions. 
21 Goodman et al. (1999) estimate an average out-patient treatment demand elasticity of approximately -0.43 and an 
average inpatient treatment demand elasticity of -1.14 (evaluated at a 50% coinsurance rate), based on a claims 
database.  In their study 25 (50) % of the increased inpatient (outpatient) usage attributable to fractional coinsurance 
comes from an increased number of users.  In TEDS, about 40 % of admissions are inpatient care and the remainder 
represents outpatient clients.  Assuming a mean coinsurance rate for all health services of 20 %, broad mental health 
parity would reduce an individual’s price of treatment by 80 %.  Based on the mean price response from Goodman 
et al., broad parity would increase the number of inpatient and outpatient treatment users by 19.4 %.  Our estimates 
(11.3 - 13.8 %) are plausible in that they about 60-70 % of the calibrated estimate.  The conclusion offers some 
reasons for the muted effects.      18
  A policy shift concurrent with the enactment of 1990s state parity legislation related to 
welfare reform.  Specification 1 controls for whether the state had implemented changes to its 
welfare policies through major waivers to its AFDC program and through implementation of 
TANF.  In addition, the models control for the total number of welfare recipients in the state, 
which declined considerably over this period partly due to the welfare reform and partly due to 
economic conditions (Dave et al., 2008).  The latter are captured by the contemporaneous and 
one-year lags of the state unemployment rate and per capita personal income.  Specification 1 
also controls for state funding of substance abuse prevention and treatment through federal block 
grants.  The results remain relatively robust suggesting that broad parity increased self-referred 
admissions by about 15 %, similar to the DDD effect of 14 %. 
  As some state policies tie funding for special groups (for instance, criminal justice 
population), capacity constraints may force crowding out of self-referred admissions. This 
possibility is captured in specification 2, which controls for the total number of criminal justice-
referred admissions.  Coefficient estimates (not reported) suggest a crowd-out elasticity of -0.12 
to -0.26 for self- and privately-referred admissions.  The effect magnitude of broad parity 
legislations is not sensitive to accounting for such crowding out.
22   
  Another potential concern relates to policy endogeneity.  States which enact 
comprehensive mental health parity laws may be systematically different from the other states.  
For instance, Sturm and Pacula (1999) show that states adopting strict parity laws had both lower 
levels of mental health care utilization and supply constraints.  This may explain why mental 
health parity laws may not have significantly increased utilization in these states (Pacula and 
Sturm, 2000).  We check for systematic baseline differences between states that enact broad 
parity legislation at some point over the sample period and states that do not, prior to enactment. 
                                                            
22 This is partially due to the controls for state economic conditions and state welfare policies, which are correlated 
with criminal-justice referrals.  If state economic and welfare measures are excluded, then accounting for criminal 
justice-referrals does reduce the effect of broad parity on treatment admissions.   19
While Sturm and Pacula (1999) found that states which adopt stricter mental health parity laws 
had low levels of mental health care utilization to begin with, we do not find any significant 
differences between the adopters and the non-adopters with respect to SA treatment admissions 
prior to the legislation. However, states which adopt broad parity do have somewhat lower health 
care expenditures per capita (by about 12%) and slightly lower Medicaid expenditures per 
enrollee (by about 6%), prior to enactment. There are no significant differences with respect to 
Medicaid enrollment (adjusting for population), arrest rates for drug abuse violations, or suicide 
mortality rates. 
  Nevertheless, the decision to enact broad parity may be dependent on states’ prior 
experience with health care spending, drug enforcement, admission trends, or other measures 
correlated with treatment admissions.  Thus, policy endogeneity results from unobserved time-
variant state factors that may be correlated with both parity laws and SA treatment admissions.  
This is analogous to an omitted variables bias in an intertemporal context.  Similar to the 
approach followed by Gruber and Zinman (2001) and Dave (2008), specifications 3-5 attempt to 
correct for this endogeneity by controlling for lagged measures potentially driving state parity 
laws such as lagged SA treatment admissions (Specification 3), lagged state health care spending 
per capita, Medicaid spending per enrollee, and Medicaid enrollment (Specification 4), and 
finally, (Specification 5) lagged state suicide mortality (a proxy for mental illness) and lagged 
state arrests related to drug possession and drug abuse violations (as proxies for state drug 
policy).  Specification 3 further controls for state-specific linear trends, which account for 
unobserved state-specific factors that vary systematically over time.  The estimates are relatively 
robust and similar to the DDD estimate -- broad parity appears to increase self-referred 
admissions by 9.6 to 15.9 percent.
23   
                                                            
23 In all models, the effect of limited parity laws is insignificant (not reported in Table 4).   20
  Specification 6 implements an additional check for policy endogeneity with lagged and 
leading parity legislation, following Model (1993). In such specifications, only the coefficients 
on the lagged policy measure should be significant.  The lead effects should be insignificant with 
coefficients close to zero.  This would then suggest that changes in parity laws are driving 
changes in treatment admissions.  If the leading effects are significant, then this suggests that 
parity laws are conditionally correlated with past shocks to treatment admissions, which would 
be an indication of policy endogeneity.
24  The point estimate of the lead broad parity law 
coefficient is insignificant and relatively small in magnitude, suggesting that current treatment 
admissions do not seem to be correlated with future parity laws.  Furthermore, the lagged effects 
are slightly larger than the contemporaneous effects estimated in specifications 3-5, suggesting a 
small lagged response to policy in addition to the contemporaneous effect.   
  Table 4 Panel B presents models for privately-referred admissions.  The extended 
specifications suggest that broad parity increased such admissions between 8.4 - 16.2 %, 
enveloping the DDD estimate of 11.4 % (Table 3). Overall, the estimates from Table 4 suggest 
that the results are robust to unobserved shocks and policy shifts possibly confounding the 
relationship between parity laws and treatment admissions.     
5.3   State Parity Legislation and Insurance Status of Individual Treatment Admissions 
  The most likely channel through which parity mandates affect treatment is through 
individual coverage, and to investigate this we next analyze whether the laws affected the 
observed coverage of treatment admissions.  Table 5 presents estimation of equation (2).  The 
first specification indicates that, relative to states that offer weak parity, states which mandate 
broad parity have a higher probability (by 3.7 percentage points) that the treatment admission is 
                                                            
24 Results are robust to alternate lag and lead structures.  Results are also similar for models that control for 
contemporaneous (in lieu of lagged) parity laws in these specifications.   21
privately insured after enacting the law.  There is no commensurate significant impact of 
limited parity legislation.   
  While parity legislation is likely to affect employed individuals or their spouses and 
dependents who have some form of health insurance, public funding is likely to target more 
vulnerable populations at risk of being on public support.  Thus, crowd-out of private for public 
coverage is not a significant concern.  Nevertheless, the possibility remains that states may be 
relying on parity legislation as a substitute for public funding or public coverage of mental health 
and SA treatment.  Specification 2 suggests that this is not the case; among states which enacted 
broad parity, public insurance coverage of treatment admissions actually increased.  The 
combined increase in private and public coverage of SA admissions serves to reduce the 
probability that an admission is uninsured by ten percentage points among states that enact broad 
parity (specification 3). 
  That broad mental health parity raises the probability of a publicly-insured admission is 
suggestive of states increasing funding efforts to treat and prevent SA problems over the sample 
period.  This is supported by our finding that while limited parity has no impact on private 
insurance, it is associated with a 2.5 percentage points increase in public insurance coverage 
which is mirrored by a decrease of a similar magnitude in the probability of an uninsured 
admission.  SA funding through block grants was increasing at an average annual rate of about 
five percent.  General expansions in Medicaid eligibility were also under way, reflected in the 
increase in the prevalence of public insurance among treatment clients (Table 1), and many states 
started to include drug treatment coverage under welfare reform or mandatory diversion 
programs.  To the extent that these policies also coincided with the enactment of parity 
legislation, the estimate of the net effect of broad parity on uninsured admissions would be 
biased upwards (in absolute magnitude).  Specifications 4-6 correct for this confounding by   22
adding in a vector of state funding-related covariates, including the SA treatment block grant 
and the percent of treatment admissions in the state covered by Medicaid and covered under 
other government payments.  It is reassuring that, in specification 5, broad or limited parity 
legislation no longer has any effect on the probability that the admission is publicly insured.  
Parity legislation should most plausibly affect private insurance coverage.  Specifications 4 and 6 
indeed suggest that broad SA parity raises the probability that an admission is privately insured 
and lowers the probability that an admission is uninsured by about 3.5 to 3.9 percentage points. 
There is no effect of limited parity on insurance coverage of treatment admissions. The next two 
models control for a rich set of client-specific covariates including indicators for employment, 
marital status, and substances of abuse and also control for lagged measures of drug enforcement 
and suicide mortality in the state.  The magnitude of the effects remains robust.   
  This decline in the uninsured propensity, however, may not represent a net benefit or 
financial incentive to the individual if the increase in privately insured admissions (reduction in 
uninsured) is crowding out no-charge admissions.  Parity laws would impart a financial incentive 
to seek treatment only through significant cost-sharing.  However, a significant portion (49 % 
over the sample period) of admissions which are uninsured is not charged payments or falls 
under charity care.  About 40 percent of the uninsured clients pay fully out-of-pocket.  The 3.5 to 
3.9 percentage-points reduction in the probability of uninsured is roughly divided 40-60 between 
a decline in no-charge and a decline in self-pay admission probabilities.
25  That is, while 
comprehensive insurance mandates appear to reduced uninsured admissions, about 40 % of the 
reduction would have received charity care through the facilities anyway.  The remainder of the 
reduction in uninsured is matched by a decrease in admissions where the individual was fully 
responsible for payment (self-pay).  Thus, the net effect of broad parity on the probability that a 
                                                            
25 Results (not reported in the tables) are based on models for dichotomous indicators showing whether the 
admission was self-pay and no-charge.  Reduced sample sizes for detailed payment sources make these estimates 
more imprecise (p-values between 0.10 and 0.20).   23
formerly self-paying admission is now covered by private insurance is about 2.1 to 2.4 
percentage points.  This is the relevant impact to consider since it represents a pure financial 
incentive for individuals to seek treatment who otherwise may find it inaccessible due to out-of-
pocket costs.  Evaluated at the sample prevalence of uninsured clients, this translates into an 
effect size of about 3 - 4 %.  The low magnitudes are consistent with the estimates from the 
aggregate models in Table 3.
26 
5.4  Impact of Mandated-if-Offered Parity Legislation 
  All specifications thus far have indicated nil effects of limited parity legislation.  Limited 
parity states generally have a hodgepodge of laws with various exceptions and none requires 
group plans to provide both mental health and SA treatment benefits at full parity.  In order to 
investigate whether some of these limited laws may be more effective than others, of the limited 
parity states, we separate out those that have enacted “mandated if offered” laws.  These states 
require that mental health overage be equal to other medical conditions only if the plan offers 
mental health coverage.
27  The recently enacted 2008 federal law can be classified as “mandated 
if offered” since it mandates parity only if the plans offer mental health coverage; it does not 
require plans to provide mental health or SA benefits if they do not already do so.  The 
remaining limited parity states require employers to offer parity in only one of their health plans 
(mandated offering) or mandate minimum mental health coverage that is not required to be equal 
                                                            
26 The effects of the other demographic characteristics mimic the general composition of the population that is likely 
to have private health insurance (relative to public insurance or no insurance) -- white, male, and educated.  There is 
a quadratic effect of age as private insurance propensity decreases up to age 32 and then rises subsequently.  All 
models also include indicators for type of treatment into which the client was admitted.  Almost half of all SA 
treatment admissions occur on an ambulatory non-intensive outpatient basis (reference category).  Relative to these 
admissions, those which involve 24-hour detoxification services in non-hospital settings and those which involve 
long-term (more than 30 days) non-acute care are more likely to be uninsured.  All other service setting types are 
less likely to be uninsured. 
27 States with mandated-if-offered parity laws, as of 2007, are AZ, FL, IA, KY, LA, and NE.  In alternate 
specifications (results available upon request), we also separate out other forms of limited parity (mandated benefits 
and mandated offering).  We do not find significant effects of these other forms of limited parity, though large 
standard errors owing to a smaller number of states in disaggregated categories calls for some caution in interpreting 
the insignificant results.     24
to other medical conditions (minimum mandated benefit).  In specifications 1 and 2, we do not 
find statistically significant effects of mandated-if-offered laws or other limited parity legislation 
on self-referred and privately-referred SA treatment admissions, relative to weak parity states.  
This is not surprising given that the laws also do not appear to have imparted substantial cost-
sharing; there is no effect on the coverage of treatment admissions and no significant reduction 
in the probability that the admission is uninsured (specification 3).     
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
  The consensus in the prior literature indicates that substance abuse treatment is both 
efficacious and cost-effective relative to other drug-control alternatives.  Furthermore, the gap 
between heavy drug use and treatment admissions appears to have widened over the last decade.  
Thus, from a policy standpoint, it is integral to analyze the economic factors that impact flows 
into substance abuse treatment.   
  In addition to supply constraints, a significant portion of substance abusers cite cost and 
accessibility issues as a primary reason for forgoing treatment.  For instance, among privately 
insured individuals in 2007, treatment services were primarily paid out-of-pocket almost half the 
time; private insurance was the primary source of payment in only about 33 % of the cases. 
The importance of cost-sharing is highlighted by the analysis of state insurance parity legislation, 
the results of which indicate that laws which mandate broad parity for SA and mental health 
treatment are associated with an increase in the total number of self-referred treatment 
admissions.  Such legislation also raises the probability that the admission is privately insured 
and conversely, decreases the probability that the admission is uninsured.  Though there does not 
appear to be any crowding-out with respect to public insurance support, this is not the case with 
regard to charity care and non-payment where some crowd-out does exist.   Nevertheless, there is 
a net two to three percentage point reduction in the probability of uninsured self-payer treatment   25
admissions.  These effects are confined to states which support broad and comprehensive 
parity while states with limited parity do not display any positive impact on the number of 
treatment admissions or cost-sharing.   
  Several underlying factors may be attenuating the effect magnitudes of broad parity.   
First, parity legislation applies only to health insurance already offered and will most likely 
affect individuals who have some form of non-public coverage.  Data from the NSDUH indicate 
that about 60 % of the drug- and alcohol-abusing population has private health insurance 
compared to 71 % of individuals who do not have such disorders.  This may limit the scope of 
effectiveness of parity mandates by relating to substance abusers with access to non-public 
coverage in the first place.  Second, even if broad parity is found to have an effect on treatment 
admissions, policy endogeneity may imply that the estimated effect is understated if states with 
low levels of treatment admissions are more likely to adopt stricter parity laws.  While the 
specification checks we implemented suggest that the results are not materially affected when 
addressing this concern, the possibility is not fully discounted.  Third, perhaps more relevant for 
this analysis, the limited effect sizes may also reflect supply and capacity constraints.  Even if 
parity legislation induces demand for treatment by reducing costs among covered individuals, 
there may be some offset as the number of facilities have remained relatively constant over the 
past decade and waiting times have trended upwards.  This relatively inelastic supply of 
treatment, together with the two other factors mentioned, suggest that our estimates of the effects 
of parity on treatment admissions and coverage incentives may be on the conservative side. 
  Currently, only 12 states mandate that group insurers provide for mental health and SA 
treatment benefits, and that they do so on equal terms with other benefits, with minimal 
exceptions.  These states’ existing laws are, in fact, more protective than the Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, leaving significant potential to reduce chronic   26
substance abuse through more states adopting stronger parity laws.  Though the 2008 Act does 
require mental health and SA parity with respect to financial requirements and treatment 
benefits, this applies only to plans that already include mental health coverage in their benefits 
package.  Similar to the 1996 Mental Health Parity Act, the 2008 law not only does not require 
group plans to include mental health or SA coverage in their benefits, it also allows for cost 
exemptions. Six states have already enacted “mandated if offered” laws similar to the 2008 
Federal law and an additional 15 states require plans to offer minimum mental health coverage 
(though not necessarily on equal terms as other conditions).  Thus, with two-thirds of the nation 
already mandating parity at a level that is at least as protective as the 2008 federal law, there is 
perhaps little room for a strong aggregate effect.  Furthermore, extrapolating from the estimated 
effects of limited mental health parity legislation and specifically, from the insignificant effects 
of the state mandated-if-offered laws, it is unlikely that for the remaining states for whom the 
2008 law will be more protective, the federal law will have a significant impact on either cost-
sharing of SA treatment admissions, or reduction of out-of-pocket payments for individuals 
needing treatment, or increase in treatment admission flows.   
  Since parity legislation may not help to defray costs for all, policy interventions which 
subsidize treatment among uninsured users also has the potential to significantly provide 
treatment to those who need it but cite cost constraints as an impediment.  Such demand-focused 
interventions by themselves, however, are likely to have muted effects unless paired with 
policies which improve treatment supply and ease capacity constraints. 
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SA Treatment Admissions 
 
Past Year Illicit Drug Use 




Year  1992 2007 1992 2001 2001 
Male  72.6 67.5 59.2 57.3 67.6 
White  61.8 65.3 79.1 75.7 74.1 
Black  27.2 21.4 11.8 10.6 10.0 
Ages 18-24 (TEDS) / 18-25 (NHSDA)  16.7  19.7  36.2  40.0  37.1 
Ages 25-34 / 26-34  42.5  27.5 34.2 22.3 21.0 
Ages 35-44 / 35-49  28.0  28.0 24.8 30.3 30.5 
Ages 45-54 / 50 - 64  9.0  19.7  3.4  6.5  8.1 
Employed  Full-Time  27.9 22.4 56.0 60.8 61.6 
Employed Part-Time  6.8  7.6  13.5  17.0  15.4 
Unemployed 29.3  35.0  14.3  5.6  5.6 
High School and above  62.8  67.7  79.5  81.4  81.2 
Self  Referral  36.6  33.9  - - - 
Criminal Justice Referral  33.0  36.5  -  -  - 
Health Care / Employer Referral  9.3  7.4  -  -  - 
Private Health Insurance  15.8  11.7  63.5  65.6  67.7 
Public Health Insurance  19.2  26.8  13.9  12.5  12.0 
Uninsured  65.0 61.5 22.6 21.9 20.3 
Payment Source - Private Insurance  9.5  5.3  -  -  - 
Payment Source - Public Insurance  12.0  12.8  -  -  - 
Payment Source - Self  37.9  21.2  -  -  - 
Payment Source - No Charge  16.3  12.4  -  -  - 
No Prior Treatment Admissions  44.4  41.7  -  -  - 
Days waiting to enter treatment 
2  5.5  6.9  - - - 
Observations / Prevalence  1,453,260  1,663,097  11.0  11.6  7.2 
1 Data are from the Treatment Episode Dataset and the National Household Survey of Drug Abuse.  Cells represent percent of 
treatment admissions or drug users in each category, except where noted.  Observations represent maximum sample size; for 
some variables, the sample size is less due to missing information. 




Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS) & Merged Variables 
1  
1992 - 2007 
 
Variable Definition  Mean   
(Std. Deviation) 
Mental Health Parity - Broad  State provides equal coverage for a broad range of mental health 
conditions, including substance abuse disorders, with little or no 
exceptions, and which applies to group health insurance plans 
0.1027 
(0.3036) 
Mental Health Parity - 
Limited 
State has limited mental health insurance parity laws, which for instance 
limit equal coverage to a specific set of mental health conditions, requires 
equal coverage only if the plan offers mental health coverage, requires only 
one plan to offer an option of equal coverage, or mandates minimum but 
not equal mental health coverage 
0.7033 
(0.4568) 
Mental Health Parity - Weak  State has no laws relating to mental health insurance parity or state has 
weak laws with various exceptions such as excluding substance abuse 
disorders and applicable to only state employees 
0.1940 
(0.3954) 
Mental Health Parity - 
Mandated if Offered 
State Requires that mental health overage be equal to other medical 
conditions if the plan already offers mental health coverage 
0.1166 
(0.3211) 
Age  Age of admission  35.0416 
(9.7129) 
Male  Client is male  0.6992 
(0.4586) 
White Client  is  White  0.6183 
(0.4858) 
Black  Client is Black  0.2544 
(0.4355) 
Other Race  Client is of a race other than White or Black  0.1273 
(0.3333) 
Hispanic  Client is Hispanic  0.1270 
(0.3330) 
High School  Client is a high school graduate  0.6493 
(0.4772) 
College  Client is a college graduate  0.0461 
(0.2096) 
Private Insurance  Client has private health insurance  0.1247 
(0.3304) 
Public Insurance  Client has public health insurance, including Medicaid or Medicare  0.2262 
(0.4184) 
Uninsured  Client is uninsured  0.6491 
(0.4773) 
Payment Source - Private 
Insurance 
Treatment is covered under private insurance  0.0738 
(0.2614) 
Payment Source - Public 
Insurance 
Treatment is covered under public insurance  0.1372 
(0.3441) 
Payment Source - No 
Insurance 
Treatment is not covered under any insurance  0.7890 
(0.4080) 
Payment Source -  
Self-Pay 
Primary source of payment for the treatment admission is self-pay  0.2949 
(0.4560) 
Payment Source -  
Other 
Treatment service is provided at no-charge or covered through other 
government payments  
0.4941 
(0.5000) 




Referral Source - Private  Client was referred to substance abuse treatment through self, family,  0.3390   33
friend, health care provider, or employer  (0.4734) 
Referral Source - 
Criminal Justice 
Client was referred to substance abuse treatment through any police 
official, judge, prosecutor, probation officer, or other person affiliated with 
a Federal, State, or county judicial system 
0.4456 
(0.4970) 
State Treatment Admissions  Total annual substance-abuse treatment admissions in state  93291.41 
(90814.77) 
State Population  State population, in millions 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
11.71 
(9.45) 
State Unemployment  State unemployment rate, in percentage points 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
5.35 
(1.37) 
State Personal Income  State personal income per capita, in thousands 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
30.16 
(6.99) 
State SA Block Grant  State substance abuse prevention and treatment block grant, in millions of 
dollars. Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 
64.09 
(61.25) 
AFDC Waiver  Indicator for whether state has enacted major waivers to its Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children program prior to TANF implementation 
Source: USDHHS, 1999; CEA 1997 
0.0913 
(0.2734) 
TANF  Indicator for whether state has enacted Temporary Aid for Needy Families 
Source: USDHHS, 1999; CEA 1997 
0.6920 
(0.4527) 
Welfare Caseload  Number of welfare recipients in state, in thousands 
Source: Administration for Children and Families, USDHHS 
419.07 
(556.45) 
State Health Expenditures  State per capita total health care expenditures, in dollars 
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
4018.48 
(964.86) 
State Medicaid Expenditures  State Medicaid expenditures per enrollee, in dollars 
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
5862.37 
(2403.13) 
State Medicaid Enrollment  State Medicaid enrollment, in thousands 
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
1661.42 
(1750.69) 
State Suicide Mortality  Total deaths in state from suicide 
Source: Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 
1136.18 
(908.61) 
State Drug Abuse Arrests  Total arrests in state related to any drug abuse violation, in thousands 
Source: Uniform Crime Reports, FBI 
75.04 
(82.35) 
State Drug Possession 
Arrests 
Total arrests in state related to drug possession or use, in thousands 
Source: Uniform Crime Reports, FBI 
56.78 
(67.59) 
Service Setting - Detox. 24-
hr. Hospital Inpatient 
24-hour acute care services in a hospital setting for detoxification of 
persons with severe medical complications associated with withdrawal  
0.0537 
(0.2254) 
Service Setting - Detox. 24-
hr. Non-Hospital 
24-hour services in a non-hospital setting for safe withdrawal and transition 
to ongoing treatment 
0.1782 
(0.3827) 
Service Setting - Rehab. 
Hospital Non-Detox. 
24-hour per day medical care in hospital facility in conjunction with 
treatment services for substance abuse and dependency 
0.0097 
(0.0981) 
Service Setting - Rehab. 
Short-Term 
Typically 30 days or less of non-acute care in a setting with treatment 
services for substance abuse and dependency 
0.0840 
(0.2774) 
Service Setting - Rehab. 
Long-Term 
Typically more than 30 days of non-acute care in a setting with treatment 
services for substance abuse and dependency 
0.0764 
(0.2657) 
Service Setting - Ambulatory 
Intensive Outpatient 
At minimum, the client must receive treatment lasting two or more hours 
per day for three or more days per week 
0.0878 
(0.2830) 
Service Setting - Ambulatory 
Non-Intensive Outpatient 
Ambulatory treatment services including individual, family, and/or group 
services and/or pharmacological therapies 
0.4791 
(0.4996) 
Service Setting - Ambulatory 
Detox. 




Alcohol   Alcohol is cited as the primary, secondary, or tertiary substance of abuse  0.6862 
(0.4640) 
Cocaine  Cocaine is cited as the primary, secondary, or tertiary substance of abuse  0.3471 
(0.4761) 
Heroin  Heroin is cited as the primary, secondary, or tertiary substance of abuse  0.1811 
(0.3851) 
Marijuana  Marijuana is cited as the primary, secondary, or tertiary substance of abuse  0.3039   34
(0.4599) 
Number of Substances  Total number of substances cited  1.7226 
(0.8139) 
1 There were a total of  25,742,103 substance-abuse treatment admissions in TEDS between 1992 and 2007.  Sample size listed 
is the maximum number of observations.  For some variables (mostly, insurance and payment source), sample sizes are smaller 
due to missing records. Data for state health and Medicaid expenditures/enrollment span 1992-2004.    35
Table 3 
State Health Insurance Parity and Aggregate SA Treatment Admissions 
1 
Poisson Regression Models 
 
















Model  1 2 3 4 
Mental Health 













































































































State  Indicators  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Indicators  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo  R-squared    0.970 0.976 0.977 0.951 
Observations   752  745  745  745 
1 Dependent variable represents a count of the number of SA treatment admissions, aggregated for each state and year.  
Coefficient estimates from fixed effects Poisson regression models are presented.  Standard errors are adjusted for over-
dispersion and reported in parentheses.  DDD estimate is obtained by subtracting the coefficient estimate on Criminal Justice 
Referrals reported in model 4, and standard errors for the differenced estimates are presented in brackets.  Models for self-
referred, privately-referred, and criminal-justice referred admissions also control for total SA treatment admissions.  Statistical 
significance is denoted as follows: *** p≤0.01, ** 0.01<p≤0.05, * 0.05<p≤0.10.  Pseudo R-squared represents one minus the 
ratio of the log-likelihoods for the full model versus the intercept-only model.    
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Table 4 
State Health Insurance Parity and Aggregate SA Treatment Admissions 
1 
Poisson Regression Models 
Specification Checks 
Model  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Panel A - Dependent Variable: SA Treatment Admissions Self-Referred 
Mental Health Parity  












Mental Health Parity 
- Broad (Lag) 
_ _ _ _ _  0.1650*** 
(0.0405) 
Mental Health Parity 
- Broad (Lead) 
_ _ _ _ _  -0.0046 
(0.0585) 
Pseudo R-squared 
2  0.978 0.978 0.989 0.981 0.980 0.982 
Observations    745 745 692 557 745 638 
 
Panel B - Dependent Variable: SA Treatment Admissions Privately-Referred 
Mental Health Parity  












Mental Health Parity 
- Broad (Lag) 
_ _ _ _ _  0.1385*** 
(0.0433) 
Mental Health Parity 
- Broad (Lead) 
_ _ _ _ _  0.0258 
(0.0613) 
Pseudo  R-squared    0.978 0.979 0.989 0.982 0.980 0.983 
Observations    745 745 692 557 745 638 
 
State Covariates 
2  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Criminal Justice-Referred 
SA Treatment Admissions 
No Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged State SA Treatment 
Admissions 
No No  Yes  No No Yes 
Lagged State Health & 
Medicaid Spending 
3 
No No No  Yes 
 
No No 
Lagged State Suicide 
Mortality 
4 
No No No No Yes  Yes 
Lagged State Drug Abuse 
Arrests 
4 
No No No No Yes  Yes 
Lagged State Drug 
Possession Arrests 
4 
No No No No Yes  Yes 
State-Specific  Trends  No No  Yes  No No No 
State  Indicators  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Indicators  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1 See notes to Table 1.  
2 Vector includes contemporaneous and one-year lag of state personal income per capita and state unemployment 
rate, state substance abuse prevention and treatment block grant, and indicators of welfare reform (AFDC Waiver, 
TANF, and log welfare caseloads). 
3 Vector includes one and two-year lags of total health care spending per capita in state, state Medicaid spending per 
enrollee, and state Medicaid enrollment. 
4 Vector includes one and two-year lags of state suicide deaths, state-level arrests from any drug abuse violation, and 
state-level arrests for illicit drug possession. 
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 Table 5 
State Health Insurance Parity and Insurance Status of Treatment Admissions 
1 
Probit Regression Models 
Model  1  2  3 4  5 6 7 8 































































































































































































Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Covariates 








No  No No No  No No  Yes  Yes 
Lagged State 
Suicide / Drug 
Arrest Measures 
6 
No  No No No  No No  Yes  Yes 
Year  Indicators  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State  Indicators  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes   38
Pseudo  R-squared  0.159  0.252 0.254 0.160  0.261 0.248 0.170 0.249 
Percent Correctly 
Predicted 
67.5  87.3 82.3 67.6  87.9 82.1 69.3 82.1 
Observations  7,172,094  7,172,094 7,172,094 7,172,094  7,172,094 7,172,094 7,172,094 7,172,094 
1 Dependent variable represents a dichotomous indicator of whether a substance abuse treatment admission is privately insured, publicly insured, or uninsured.  Marginal effects 
from probit models are presented.  Standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary correlation within state-year cells and reported in parentheses.  Significance is denoted as follows: *** 
p≤0.01, ** 0.01<p≤0.05, * 0.05<p≤0.10.  Pseudo R-squared (representing one minus the ratio of the log-likelihoods for the full model versus the intercept-only model) and Percent 
Correctly Predicted (based on the predicted probability relative to a cutoff of the sample mean) are presented as goodness-of-fit measures. 
2 Vector includes seven indicators for service provider type: 24 hour detox services in hospital and non-hospital settings, 24 hour non-detox medical care in hospital setting, short-
term (30 days or less) non-acute care, long-term (more than 30 days) non-acute care, ambulatory intensive outpatient, and ambulatory detoxification). Reference group is 
ambulatory non-intensive outpatient. 
3 Vector includes total number of substance abuse treatment admissions in the state, state-level personal income per capita, state unemployment rate, and log state population. 
4 Vector includes state substance abuse treatment block grant, percent of treatment admissions in state covered by Medicaid, and percent of treatment admissions in state covered 
by state funds including public insurance and other state payments to SA facilities. 
5 Vector includes indicators for number of substances of abuse, and indicators for whether alcohol, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana were cited as the primary, secondary, or tertiary 
substances of abuse. 
6 Vector includes one and two-year lags of state suicide deaths, state-level arrests from any drug abuse violation, and state-level arrests for illicit drug possession.   39
 
Table 6 
Effect of Mandated Offering Legislation 
1 
 
Estimation Poisson  Probit 









Model  1  2  4 
Mental Health 
Parity -  




















State  Indicators  Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Indicators  Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared   0.981  0.982   
Observations   644  644  6,913,414 
1 Sample is limited to states and years which have not enacted broad mental health parity legislation.  Reference category is weak 
parity.  For Poisson models, dependent variable represents a count of the number of SA treatment admissions, aggregated for 
each state and year. Models control for basic covariates listed in Table 2, state covariates, and vector of lagged suicide mortality 
and drug arrests.  For probit models, dependent variable represents a dichotomous indicator of whether a substance abuse 
treatment admission is privately insured or uninsured.  Marginal effects are presented.  See notes to Table 5.  Model controls for 
basic covariates listed in Table 5, state covariates, service setting, admission characteristics, and vector of lagged suicide 
mortality and drug arrests. 
 
 
 